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The Case of the Diamond Princess: 
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 (June 30, 2020) This Case Study is the First of a Three-Part Series. This document shares 
information pertinent to the period of the Passenger Quarantine. Part II will cover the challenge 
of Repatriation of the Passengers to their Home Countries. And Part III will discuss the U.S. and 
Other Government Relationships with Cruise Lines.  
CASE STUDY 
As the COVID-19 Pandemic emerged as a true global crisis in the first quarter of 2020, 
passengers on the Diamond Princess cruise ship were stranded aboard the ocean liner as cases of 
the infection escalated among passengers. When the ship’s outbreak was at its worst, it was 
considered to have the largest number of COVID-19 cases outside of mainland China.  
Part I: The Quarantine 
The Diamond Princess cruise ship is owned by the British-American cruise company Carnival 
Corporation and operated as part of the Princess Cruises fleet. It contains 1,337 guest cabins and 
approximately 1,000 crew members spread across the 18 decks of the ship. On January 20, 2020 
the ship began its 16-day cruise (which became 15 days) starting from Yokohama Port in Japan. 
The first leg of the journey brought the cruise liner to Hong Kong where it arrived on January 
25th. The ship then sailed to Chan May Port, Vietnam on January 27th, Chai Lan, Vietnam on 
January 28th, Keelung, Taiwan on January 31st and Naha, Japan on February 1st. After leaving 
Naha the ship began its return journey back towards Yokohama. That same day, when the ship 
was on its way back to Yokohama for its conclusion of the journey, the captain received word 
from the Hong Kong government that an individual who had disembarked the cruise on January 
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25th, had since tested positive for COVID-19[1]. The Hong Kong native had been experiencing a 
cough since January 19th, one day before he boarded the cruise, and had a fever since January 
30th, five days after he disembarked in Hong Kong. He sought medical attention on January 30th 
where medical professionals administered a test for COVID-19. When the test result proved 
positive, the Hong Kong Center for Health Protection (CHP) “immediately commenced 
epidemiological investigations and conducted relevant contact tracing,” which allowed the CHP 
to connect him to the Diamond Princess and issue the warning to the crew[2]. However, despite 
the gravity of the situation unfolding in China, the captain waited nearly 48 hours to inform the 
Diamond Princess crew and its passengers about what he had learned, which allowed the virus 
ample time to spread.  
It was February 3rd when the captain shared what he had learned, two days after he received the 
call from the Hong Kong officials. In spite of his announcement, the normal recreational 
activities throughout the ship continued as planned. Buffets were open, celebrations and parties 
proceeded as scheduled. The only noticeable difference was a greater presence of hand sanitizers 
throughout the ship[3].   
Essentially, the approximately 3,700 passengers and crew members were allowed to roam the 
ship freely with zero restriction until approximately 11:00 PM that evening, when the captain 
announced  that everyone should remain inside their cabins. At this point, the ship was docked 
off Daikoku Pier at Yokohama Port in Japan, waiting for health officials to come aboard the ship, 
administer tests and discuss symptoms with passengers, should they have any. At this point, tests 
were only being considered for those who were experiencing symptoms, such as a fever, but this 
was later expanded to high-risk individuals such as the elderly and those with pre-existing health 
conditions. On February 5th, the first round of test results revealed ten positive cases of 
coronavirus aboard the ship, instigating the infamous “Diamond Princess Quarantine.”  
Lack of Clarity, Understanding, and Training Leads to Chaos 
From the very first day of the ship’s quarantine, the passengers and crew found themselves 
fighting a seemingly no-win situation. The first issue was the lack of clarity as to who was in 
charge. Was it the cruise line itself?  Was it the country where the ship was docked (Japan)? Or 
was it the country for which the owning company of the ship was registered? Or perhaps was 
handling of the situation to be led by the countries of origin of the passengers? This ambiguity 
led to confusion as it pertained to the policies, rules and regulations of quarantine. Thus, the 
delivery of information to the crew, and ultimately the passengers, was extremely delayed, 
leaving those on the ship confused and clueless. 
As days went by and the quarantine continued, the world learned more about the COVID-19 
virus itself. Aboard the ship, on the other hand, there seemed to be a general lack of 
understanding about the severity of the virus. The lack of knowledge meant a lack of action to 
tackle the growing situation. As the quarantine continued, there were more examples of just how 
uninformed the crew truly was.  
The improper use and overall limited supply of personal protective equipment (PPE) on the ship 
was another factor. When the quarantine first began, the Diamond Princess crew was forced to 
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step up and manage the quarantine themselves, despite no training for such an event. In the 
beginning, the crew delivered meals three times a day, face to face, to each and every passenger, 
all while wearing the same gloves. The crew also used china to serve the food (rather than single-
use cutlery and plates), which created more opportunity for the virus to spread. What’s more, the 
crew failed to wear PPE when removing dirty dishes or linens from passengers’ cabins.  
Just as significantly, there was an absence of consistent and equitable COVID-19 testing 
throughout the ship. The original process involved only testing passengers who started to 
experience flu-like symptoms. The passenger would have to wait a few days for the results, and 
if they tested positive they would be removed from the ship and brought to a hospital on shore 
for expert care. The problem with this approach was two-fold: the delay allowed for potentially-
infected passengers to remain on the ship, further spreading the virus; and passengers needed to 
show symptoms before getting a test at all. However, nearly 18% of cases on the ship were found 
among individuals who displayed no symptoms whatsoever[4]. Therefore by only testing a select 
number of passengers, the Diamond Princess was at risk of permitting potentially infected 
passengers remain on board.  
Eva Lee, an infectious disease specialist at the Georgia Institute of Technology has since referred 
to the Diamond Princess as a “quarantine nightmare,” and also disapproved of the testing 
approach saying that “the spread, no doubt, involves those without symptoms”[5]. This statement 
is echoed in the United States where labs throughout the country complained that the screening 
process was “far too restrictive”[6].  
A third challenge of this situation was that the responsibility of crisis management fell on the 
ship’s crew. Crew members were constantly put in harm's way in an attempt to feed, entertain 
and care for the passengers on the ship, all while maintaining their pre-outbreak living and eating 
arrangements. The crew still shared four people to a bathroom, dined in a communal mess hall, 
and worked in close proximity across departments on the ship.  
Essentially, the safety protocols and precautions put in place for the passengers were not kept 
consistent for the crew, creating an environment where their lives were put at risk to help take 
care of others. This was, of course, as they attempted to keep people safe in a way that was 
completely foreign to the vessel where they were confined. When compared to a hospital, a 
cruise ship filled with people is more of “an incubator for viruses than a good place for 
quarantine”[7]. 
Unanswered Questions? 
There is little doubt among experts that the handling of the virus onboard the Diamond Princess 
was an abject failure from the onset. Simply put by Dr. Anthony Fauci, the Director of the (US) 
National Institute of Allergies and Infectious Diseases, “...it failed”[8].  
Despite this acknowledgement, there is still no clear answer on who should be in charge in future 
situations that mimic this one. The Japanese government and the Diamond Princess corporate 
leadership disagreed from the beginning about who was in charge. At the time, the Japanese 
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officials feared bringing potentially infected passengers on shore, since there was no clear place 
to quarantine everyone. And, they did not want the virus to spread throughout Japan.   
After 39 days on the ship (and over three weeks in quarantine) the last of the 2,666 passengers 
finally disembarked and began their journeys home on February 27th; only to reset the clock and 
begin an additional two week quarantine in their home countries. However, the ship remained 
docked in Japan for another three months while the company focused their efforts on 
quarantining and repatriating the remaining crew members who had not yet departed on 
government charter flights[9]. 
The Diamond Princess eventually departed from Yokohama, Japan on May 16th and reported 
that it was headed for Port Dickinson in Malaysia to finalize the crew repatriation efforts. 
However, on May 25th it unexpectedly arrived in Manila Bay where it joined an additional 20 or 
so cruise ships which are waiting out the “no-sail” order there until they can resume operations, 
hopefully sometime in October.  
What solutions remain? The need for a more concise, concrete and standardized set of guidelines 
has become painfully apparent. By creating and developing standards for these types of 
situations, countries and passengers can feel more at ease knowing that the guests, crew and ship 
will be well taken care of in the event of an emergency.  
Does the industry have to completely rethink the cruise experience – for passengers and crew? 
How should amenities and recreational activities be changed? Should the medical resources 
aboard the ship be strengthened and elevated?  Does this mark the death of the buffet? How will 
cleaning and sanitation of the cabins and public spaces be upgraded?  
Did We Learn Any Lessons? 
All facets of the hospitality business have been dealt a detrimental hand due to the COVID-19 
pandemic. The cruise industry, as modeled by the series of events aboard the Diamond Princess 
was severely impacted and is hopefully using this time of “no travel” and “shelter-in-place” to 
revisit processes and operations. The cruise lines need to work in tandem and come to a 
consensus to resolve for the future: Who is in charge of managing a crisis like this? Should 
healthy passengers and infected guests be kept in close proximity to one another? What sort of 
precautions should be in place for the passengers and the crew members? How important is the 
timing of the response to the long-term success of a crisis management situation?  
The Diamond Princess teaches us that the virus spreads easily between people who are in close 
proximity – as evidenced by how quickly the virus spread among  the crew. A Center for Disease 
Control (CDC) study showed that of the 20 crew members who tested positive the first week of 
the quarantine, 16 of them were on the same deck and 15 had the same job[10], demonstrating that 
shared space and increased touchpoints contribute to virus spread. The Diamond Princess also 




1. What could the leadership of the Diamond Princess—the captain and the company 
itself—have done to handle this situation better? 
2. Who should develop a Pandemic Preparedness Plan (PPP)? Who will enforce it? The 
country of port? The country of ship registry? 
3. From an operations standpoint, how could the crew take better care for the passengers 
without putting themselves at risk? What structure of contingency planning can be in 
place to prepare staff and crew for dire situations? 
4. Ethically speaking, should the crew of the ship be allowed to refuse to work in these 
conditions if they feel that their own health and well-being are at risk? 
5. What are the roles and responsibilities of the cruise companies in all of this? After all, 
aren’t the employees and passengers under their care? 
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